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REACTIONS TO WAL-MART V. DUKES:
LITIGATION STRATEGY AND LEGAL CHANGE
Andrew J. Trask*

INTRODUCTION

In 1967, a warrantholder in a small company called Walnut Grove
filed a class action against W.R. Grace & Co.1 He alleged that when
W.R. Grace & Co. bought Walnut Grove, it improperly characterized
the transaction as a "liquidation" rather than a merger, depriving him
of the chance to buy stock in the company. 2 The lawsuit is notable for
several reasons, including that it was one of the first class actions filed
under the "new" Rule 23 after it was amended in 1966, and it was one
of the first class actions to allege violations of the Securities Exchange
Act.
But the case is remarkable for another reason: during the course of
briefing, W.R. Grace argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction
over the case because the warrantholder's individual claims were not
worth enough to meet the amount in controversy requirement for federal diversity jurisdiction.3 The plaintiff, on the other hand, argued
that, because the case was a class action, he could simply aggregate
the total value of the claims he sought to represent in order to reach
the amount in controversy. 4 The court ruled against the plaintiff, noting that several other class action plaintiffs had unconvincingly ad5
vanced the same argument.
To understand what is truly remarkable about this argument, we
must skip ahead thirty-odd years to another set of cases addressing the
question of when federal courts have jurisdiction over class actions.
This time, however, the defendants argued for aggregating the claims
to meet the amount in controversy requirement, and the plaintiffs ar* Counsel, McGuireWoods LLP; coauthor of The Class Action Playbook. See BRIAN ANDERSON & ANDREW TRASK, THE CLASS ACTION PLAYBOOK (2d. ed. 2012). Many thanks to the

editors of the DePaul Law Review for inviting me to their Symposium, and to the participants
for very helpful feedback. Thanks also to Kathleen Lawton-Trask and Alexandra Trask for their
support and contributions.
1. See Pomierski v. W.R. Grace & Co., 282 F. Supp. 385 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
2. See id. at 385, 388-89.
3. Id. at 390.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 390-91.
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gued against jurisdiction. 6 The primary change in the intervening
years was that state courts had proved more amenable to certifying
class actions than federal courts. As a result, the tactics had changed:
plaintiffs typically filed cases in state court, defendants removed them
to federal court, and then plaintiffs moved for remand. Ten years
later, Congress passed the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), which
states that courts must look at aggregated claims, and the jurisdictional fight moved on to whether a named plaintiff could file a case in
state court and seek no more than the $5 million amount in contro7
versy in order to keep the case there.
What do these decades-old jurisdictional battles have to do with the
Supreme Court's recent opinion in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes?
More than you might think. The title of this Symposium is Class Action Rollback? and, in addition to being a lawyerly pun on one of WalMart's marketing slogans, it carries with it an assumption that there is
an optimal level of class actions-a preferred doctrine-and deviations from that level are a "rollback" to a dark age when mighty corporations roamed the earth preying on small consumers and
employees.
Even federal courts cannot decide whether Dukes has wrought a
significant change in class action law. Numerous trial courts have
treated the case as simply clarifying the law. One trial court in the
northern district of Illinois announced that "it hardly needs stating
that neither Dukes nor Jamie S. 'changed' the law on class certification. Class certification is still governed by the [Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23], and the requirements of that rule have not changed
substantively .... ,,8 The eastern district of Oklahoma agrees: "XTO
also contends that the Supreme Court's decision in Wal-Mart has implemented a material shift in the class certification analysis requiring
the denial of certification in this case. The Court disagrees." 9 The
southern district of New York also agrees, at least in part.1 0
6. See, e.g., Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 F.3d 1353, 1355-60 (11th Cir. 1996).
7. In March of 2013, the Supreme Court determined that this tactic was not a valid method of
avoiding federal jurisdiction under CAFA. Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, No. 11-1450, 2013
U.S. LEXIS 2370, at *9 (Mar. 13, 2013) (reversing remand because "Knowles lacked the authority to concede the amount-in-controversy issue for the absent class members").
8. Corey H. v. Chi. Bd. of Educ., No. 92 C3409, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100316, at *17-18
(N.D. Il1.July 19, 2012). "Jamie S." refers to a Seventh Circuit opinion discussing commonality.
See Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Schs., 668 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 2012).
9. Chieftain Royalty Co. v. XTO Energy, Inc., No. CIV-11-29-FHS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
51593, at *17 (E.D. Okla. Apr. 12, 2012).
10. Jermyn v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 276 F.R.D. 167, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) ("Dukes makes no
new law that impacts in any way this Court's certification of the Rule 23(b)(3) 'damages
class.'").
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Taking the contrary position, the Fifth Circuit is equally emphatic
that Dukes "has heightened the standards for establishing commonality under Rule 23(a)(2)." 11 It is joined by the central district of California: "[N]otwithstanding the Supreme Court's protestation to the
contrary, it is somewhat difficult to understand Dukes as doing something other than melding the commonality requirement with the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) .... ,,a2 The confusion is
understandable, and it centers around how people view the law-either as something slowly "discovered" by analysis, or as part of a
progression.
While historical arguments about the development of class actions
are common, they are also largely wrong. The law is not on a single
trajectory from less "justice" to more, or from more protection of certain interests to less. In the United States, where the law is largely
judge-made common law supplemented by statute, the law is a product of judicial opinions, which are themselves the product of a constant struggle between lawyers representing opposing parties. There
is no "natural" position for a given side. Instead, there are only positions that provide an advantage in a given case. However, some parties, or some lawyers, are more forward-thinking: they may adopt
positions that lose in a given case, but set up larger, more systemic
changes in the law that will prove more advantageous.
Viewed as part of this larger strategic struggle, the Dukes opinion is
neither a triumph for defendants (although it improves their circumstances in the short-term), nor an insurmountable defeat for plaintiffs.
Further, despite the many academics and lawyers who have written
otherwise, it does not represent the "demise" of the class action. 13 Instead, Dukes is simply a strategic reset, adjusting a doctrinal drift that
occurred over the course of many years. When viewed in the context
of class actions' history and a year's worth of reactions to the case, it is
clear that Dukes has not wreaked the massive disruptions to class action practice that many scholars warned about. To be sure, Dukes has
certainly had an effect, even a significant one, on class action practice.
But it has not heralded the demise of the class action, nor has it pro11. M.D. v. Perry, 675 F.3d 832, 839-40 (5th Cir. 2012).
12. Cambridge Lane, LLC v. J-M Mfg. Co., No. CV 10-6638-GW(VBKx), 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 43533, at *5 n.2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2012) (citation omitted).
13. See, e.g., George Rutherglen, Wal-Mart, AT&T Mobility, and the Decline of the Deterrent
Class Action, 98 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 24, 25 (2012), www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2012/04/
14/Rutherglen.pdf; Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-TotalDemise
of the Modern ClassAction, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 375 (2005); Benjamin Sachs-Michaels, Note,
The Demise of Class Actions Will Not Be Televised, 12 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 665,
668-70 (2011).
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vided a renaissance for defendants. Instead, it has afforded defendants the opportunity to defeat the kinds of class actions most likely to
result in either costly appeals or blackmail-style settlements.
II.

Two

MODELS OF CLASS ACTIONS

It is possible to divide the vast majority of commentary about class
actions (and even many of the judicial rulings on them) into two
schools of thought. The crudest labels for these schools would be
"pro-plaintiff" and "pro-defendant," but those labels do not communicate many of the underlying assumptions that these sides hold. It
would be more accurate (and more fair to each side) to talk about
"progressive" and "reform" arguments.
Under the "progressive" model, scholars assume that a continual
evolution of legal substance and procedure towards a common goal
exists. The most rhetorical way of thinking about it would be from
"less justice" to "more justice," but in class action terms that translates to a progression from more restrictions on the use of class actions to fewer.
Many of the advocates of this model are open about their belief that
class actions should be easy to certify. 14 These advocates usually have
a number of justifications for increasing the role of the class action.
They tend to believe that, left unchecked, corporations will take advantage of individuals in undetectable ways. 15 Further, they believe
that the threat of class actions-whether meritorious or not-will de16
ter corporate misconduct.
In contrast to the progressive model, the reform model argues that
class actions tend to invite abuse. In particular, supporters of this
model express two concerns. First, they worry that the aggregation of
claims leads to fees that encourage plaintiffs' lawyers to act badly: at
best, they create a deadweight loss by collecting large fees that would
otherwise go to deserving class members; 17 at worst, they lead to the
14. See, e.g., Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013); Rutherglen, supra note 13, at 29 ("That is the dismaying lesson of Wal-Mart. It
might not foretell the death of class actions, which the Supreme Court has continued to endorse
in other respects, but it does diminish the frequency of class actions." (footnote omitted)).
15. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Class Dismissed: ContemporaryJudicial Hostility to Small-Claims
Consumer Class Actions, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 305, 317-18 (2010).
16. See, e.g., Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 2043, 2047 (2010) (arguing that awarding plaintiffs' attorneys fees equal to 100% of the
plaintiffs' judgment will enhance deterrence); Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the
Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility of EntrepreneurialLawyers, 155 U. PA. L.
REV. 103, 105-07 (2006) (noting that deterrence is the primary goal of class actions).
17. See, e.g., Jeffrey Hammond & James E. West, Class Action Extraction?, 116 PUB. CHOICE
91, 97 (2003).
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filing of meritless claims for the sole purpose of extorting large-fee
settlements.1 8 Second, they worry that the rush to aggregate claims
often leads courts to cut corners in ways that compromise the rights of
either absent class members or defendants.1 9 These commentators
rarely if ever advocate the abolition of the class action; instead they
argue that the device should be limited so that it does more good than
harm.
So both the progressive and the reform models of class action litigation advance normative arguments. Much legal scholarship relies on
"normative" arguments-that a given doctrine should be decided in a
given way. These arguments make sense if one assumes that a point
exists at which legal rules become set in stone. However, that does
not happen in the long-term. Even if one could identify a single rule
that would always apply in a given situation, human beings, and especially lawyers, are hard-wired to push back on rules. 20 Hence, a "settled" rule in litigation simply does not exist. Rules are always subject
to appeal, distinction, and collateral attack. This is particularly true in
the realm of class actions, which involve particularly high stakes.
Moreover, many of these "normative" arguments tend to be useless
for both the judges who write opinions and the lawyers who try to
persuade them.

III.

THE DUKES CASE

To give a brief background on Dukes, seven named plaintiffs-all
women-brought a nationwide class action alleging that various members of Wal-Mart's management discriminated against them in pay
and promotion decisions. 21 The plaintiffs argued that, despite WalMart's official policy prohibiting sex discrimination, its practice of allowing its managers wide discretion in pay and promotion decisions
resulted in a disproportionate number of promotions and raises for
men. 22 While one might think (and Wal-Mart argued) that "excessive
discretion" sounds like the opposite of a common issue, the plaintiffs
18. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298-99 (7th Cir. 1995) (discussing
concerns about "blackmail settlements").

19. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish et al., Cy Pres Relief and the Pathologies of the Modern Class
Action: A Normative and Empirical Analysis, 62 FLA. L. REV. 617, 619-23 (2010).
20. W. BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW 117 (2010) ("Lawyers know that
no matter how clear a rule appears to be, there will be some exploitable ambiguity, some room
for manipulation.").
21. For a fuller account of the Dukes opinion and the procedural maneuvering leading up to
it, see Andrew J. Trask, Wal-Mart v. Dukes: Class Actions and Legal Strategy, 2011 CATO SUP.
CT. REV. 319, 328-29.
22. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 141 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
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responded that the class was united by a common corporate culture
23
that featured pervasive gender discrimination.
The District Court for the Northern District of California certified a
class of "[a]ll women employed at any Wal-Mart domestic retail store
at any time since December 26, 1998, who have been or may be subjected to Wal-Mart's challenged pay and management track promo'24
tions policies and practices.
Both the plaintiffs and Wal-Mart appealed the ruling-Wal-Mart
appealed the certification of the class as error while the plaintiffs challenged the lower court's limitation of backpay to only current employees.25 A three-judge panel affirmed the certification,2 6 as did an en
28
banc panel on rehearing. 27 Neither opinion was unanimous.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review two questions: (1)
when plaintiffs can seek Rule 23(b)(2) certification for a class that
seeks money damages and (2) sua sponte, "[w]hether the class certifi9
cation ordered under Rule 23(b)(2) was consistent with Rule 23(a)."'2
In an opinion authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court unanimously held that plaintiffs could not use Rule 23(b)(2) as an alternative means of certifying a difficult monetary damages class. 30 It also
held (in a portion supported by a five-justice majority) that a finding
of commonality requires a court to identify questions "capable of
classwide resolution-which means that determination of its truth or
falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of
'31
the claims in one stroke.
IV.

THE REACTION TO DUKES

Leaving aside scholarly reaction, the conduct of both litigants and
courts since the Supreme Court decided Dukes indicates that the
opinion hardly led to a "rollback" of class actions. Class action plaintiffs have not slowed their pace of filings. In fact, a third-party survey
commissioned by a class action defense firm found that in 2012, "corporate legal departments expect to handle slightly more [class ac23. Id. at 145.
24. Id. at 141-42.
25. See Trask, supra note 21, at 336.
26. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 474 F.3d 1214, 1215 (9th Cir. 2007).
27. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
28. See Dukes, 474 F.3d at 1244 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting); Dukes, 603 F.3d at 628 (Ikuta, J.,
dissenting); id. at 652 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting).
29. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 795 (2011).
30. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2558-59 (2011).
31. Id. at 2551.
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tions]-on average, 5.4 matters per company, up from 4.4 in 2011." ' 32
That survey also found that labor and employment lawsuits remain
one of the three most prevalent forms of class action that corporations
face. 3 3 Similarly, a survey of workplace-related class actions by another defense firm found that, "[b]y the numbers, [Fair Labor Standards Act] and [Employment Retirement Income Security Act]
litigation filings stayed constant over the past year, while employment
discriminationcases increased. '34 That report also predicted, based on
increased numbers of charges filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), "a significant jump in the coming
year" for employment class actions. 35 These surveys were published
by defense firms hoping to demonstrate their expertise in order to
attract future clients; as a result, they have no incentive to overstate
filings. If the Dukes opinion really represented a "rollback" of class
actions, let alone their imminent demise, one would not expect an increase in filings.
Additionally, the Dukes plaintiffs have not given up in the face of
the Supreme Court's opinion. Instead, they have done as the decision
suggested by scaling down their efforts. Rather than arguing for a
nationwide class, they launched a campaign of single-state class ac36
tions asserting the same claims against Wal-Mart.
The reaction of the courts is equally important in determining
whether Dukes represents some kind of rollback. Here, too, the results are more nuanced than either the progressive or reform models
32. THE 2012 CARLTON FIELDS CLASS ACTION SURVEY: BEST PRACTICES IN REDUCING COST

AND MANAGING RISK IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 4 (2012). One could argue that defense

expectations are not the same as actual filings. However, given the tightness of legal budgeting,
there is no reason to assume that these departments would significantly inflate their
expectations.
33. Id. at 7. One explanation for the prevalence of labor/employment class actions is the
development of class actions under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). See 29 U.S.C.
§§ 203-19 (2006). Unlike Title VII class actions, which often delve into complicated questions of
hiring and promotion qualifications, FLSA class actions deal with simpler questions of whether
certain wage policies comply with the FLSA. See, e.g., Ross v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 667 F.3d 900,
909 (7th Cir. 2012); Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 5 07-cv-4009-JAJ, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 95814, at *10-11 (N.D. Iowa Aug. 25, 2011).
34. SEYFARTH SHAW LLP, ANNUAL WORKPLACE CLASS ACTION LITIGATION REPORT 3
(2012) (emphasis added). "By the close of the year, ERISA lawsuits totaled 8,414 (down slightly
as compared to 9,038 in 2010), FLSA lawsuits totaled 6,779 (up slightly as compared to 6,761 in
2010), and employment discrimination filings totaled 14,771 lawsuits (an increase from 14,559 in
2010)." Id.
35. Id.
36. See Ariane de Vogue, 'We're Back': Walmart Plaintiffs File Amended Sex Discrimination
Complaint, ABC NEWS (Oct. 27, 2011, 4:16 PM), http://abcnews.go.comlblogs/politics/2011/10/
were-back-walmart-plaintiffs-file-amended-sex-discrimination-complaint.
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would have us believe. Many courts have followed Dukes.37 This result makes sense because the Supreme Court is supposed to provide
direction on difficult issues. However, several lower courts have also
begun to distinguish the opinion in various ways in order to facilitate
38
the certification of various class actions.
Courts that may be so inclined, however, cannot simply ignore the
opinion. The Ninth Circuit, for example, which enjoys a reputation as
pro-certification, 39 recently vacated the certification of a class action
that, pre-Dukes, it would most likely have affirmed. In Ellis v. Costco
Wholesale Corp.,40 the defendant appealed the certification of a Title
VII class action on behalf of "all women employed by Costco in the
'41
United States denied promotion to [AGM] and/or [GM] positions.
The Ellis class bore several striking similarities to the original Dukes
class. On a purely superficial level, it was a Title VII suit brought
against a major American discount retailer that alleged disparate impact on women. Significantly, from a legal standpoint, it sought a
combination of injunctive relief and money damages, and the plaintiffs offered expert declarations that "female employees [were] promoted at a slower rate and [were] underrepresented at the AGM and
GM levels relative to their male peers," and that "Costco [had] a per'4 2
vasive culture of gender stereotyping and paternalism.
Despite the Ninth Circuit's "amenability" to class certification, the
ruling in Dukes prevented it from taking the same course it did in its
original Dukes opinions. Instead, "[g]iven this new precedent altering
existing case law," it remanded the case to the lower court with instructions to probe more deeply into several factual questions surrounding commonality, and to find that several former employees
were inadequate class representatives to pursue prospective injunctive
43
relief.
37. Shephard's indicates that, as of September 1, 2012, 180 courts have "followed" the case.
38. Indeed, as of September 1, 2012, the Shephard's database on LEXIS/NEXIS listed 105
decisions that distinguished Dukes.
39. See Howard M. Erichson, CAFA's Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
1593, 1612 (2008) (noting that the Ninth Circuit is "relatively liberal on class certification");
Genevieve G. York-Erwin, Note, The Choice-of-Law Problem(s) in the Class Action Context, 84

N.Y.U. L. REV. 1793, 1805 n.54 (2009) (noting that the Ninth Circuit is "amenable to
certification").
40. See Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 2011).
41. Id. at 977 (alteration in original). "AGM" and "GM" referred to the titles of "Assistant
General Manager" and "General Manager."
42. Id. In one departure from Dukes, the lower court ruled on the admissibility of several of
the experts and struck part of their reports. Id. at 978.
43. Id. at 974, 988.
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However, most class actions do not have so many similarities to
Dukes. As a result, courts have additional opportunities to distinguish
cases when they believe certification is appropriate for a given class.
Looking at the various ways in which courts have distinguished Dukes
provides two insights into this strategic game. First, it offers a window
into how "adventuresome" both plaintiffs and defendants are in extending legal precedent. Indeed, in this case, it is more likely that the
defendants will be adventurous, seeking to extend the precedent,
while the plaintiffs attempt to hold it to a stricter construction. Second, in certain cases, it can also show how a court, determined to certify a class, might maneuver around adverse precedent.
So how have courts actually distinguished Dukes? What follows is
not an exhaustive list, but a brief categorization of the various ways in
which courts have found the opinion inapplicable to the lawsuits
before them. As one might expect, some of these reasons may prove
more convincing than others.
In some cases, courts have simply noted that Dukes is not applicable to the kind of litigation or procedural posture at issue. A large
number of the opinions distinguishing Dukes are Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) collective actions, which follow different procedural rules
than class actions. 44 Similarly, some courts have refused to apply
Dukes to substantive motions that have nothing to do with certifying a
class, such as a motion to dismiss. 45 Some courts have also refused to
44. See, e.g., Troy v. Kehe Food Distribs., Inc., 276 F.R.D. 642, 651 (W.D. Wash. 2011) ("Kehe
argues that the principles set forth in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes preclude going forward with
this case as a collective action. The court is not convinced." (citations omitted)); Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, No. 10-1283, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101092, at *7 n.2 (W.D. Pa. July
20, 2012) (noting that Dukes does not apply to FLSA collective actions); Moore v. Publicis
Groupe SA, No. 11 Civ. 1279, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92675, at *37 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2012)
("[M]ost federal courts in New York have held that Dukes does not heighten the standard in
section 216(b) cases .... "); Romero v. Fla. Light & Power Co., No. 6:09-cv-1401-Orl-36GJK,
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76146, at *15 (M.D. Fla. June 1, 2012) ("Dukes cannot fairly he interpreted to foreclose the use of representative testimony in FLSA collective actions."); Lagasse v.
Flextronics Am. LLC, No. 11-445ML, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86343, at *10 (D.R.I. June 1, 2012)
("[Dukes] is not directly applicable to FLSA collective actions."); Butler v. DirectSAT USA,
LLC, No. DKC 10-2747, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50119, at *18 n.9 (D. Md. Apr. 10, 2012) (same);
Chapman v. Hy-Vee, Inc., No. 10-CV-6128-W-HFS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43829, at *9 (W.D.
Mo. Mar. 29, 2012) (same); Richardson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 4:11-cv-738, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 12911, at *9 n.8 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2012) (same); Pippins v. KPMG LLP, No. 11 Civ.
377, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 949, at *19-20 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2012) (same); Rindfleisch v. Gentiva
Health Servs., No. 1:10-cv-3288-SCJ, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154667, at *12 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 29,
2011) (same); Sliger v. Prospect Mortg., LLC, No. CIV. S-11-465-LKK/EFB, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 94648, at *7-8 n.25 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2011) (same).
45. See Winfield v. Citibank, N.A., 842 F. Supp. 2d 560, 575 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (deferring a
decision on whether Dukes applied to a standing argument until after determination of class
certification); Schulken v. Wash. Mut. Bank, No. 09-CV-2708-LHK, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
117280, at *16 n.2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2011) (denying a motion to dismiss in part because Dukes
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apply Dukes to motions to strike class allegations. 46 The existence of
these opinions indicates a certain level of adventurousness by defendants, who clearly sought to extend what they viewed as a favorable
ruling into other areas of aggregate litigation.
Many courts distinguish Dukes on the ground that the proposed
classes before them could still meet its (arguably heightened) commonality requirement. In some cases, this is because of some identifiable common policy that applied uniformly to the class members, in
contrast to the discretion Wal-Mart managers exercised in promotion
decisions. 47 A significant minority of decisions that distinguish Dukes
does not apply to a mootness analysis); Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 10 Civ.
6950(LBS)(WCF), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73200, at *17-18 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2011) ("This
authority may be relevant to the substance of the plaintiff's pattern or practice. claim and her
ability to obtain certification of a class under Rule 23, but it is not pertinent to her ability or right
to bring a pattern or practice claim to the court.").
46. See Barghout v. Bayer Healthcare Pharm., No. 11-cv-1576(DMC)(JAD), 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 46197, at *29 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2012) (noting that Dukes does not apply to a motion to
strike class allegations); Woodall v. DSI Rental, Inc., No. 11-2590, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42826,
at *25 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 27, 2012) (refusing to apply Dukes to a motion to strike class allegations
because "[tlhe standards for class certification and motions to dismiss implicate different questions of law and fact"); Covillo v. Specialtys Cafe, No. C-11-594, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147489,
at *16 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2011) (same).
47. See Gray v. Steve Wall & Assocs. LLC, 444 Fed. App'x 698, 701 (4th Cir. 2011) ("It is this
uniform distribution practice which distinguishes Wal-Mart."); Williams v. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A., 280 F.R.D. 665, 672 (S.D. Fla. 2012) ("Here, the ultimate question of liability is whether
the force-placed insurance premiums charged to homeowners were unlawfully inflated and excessive."); Connor B. v. Patrick, 278 F.R.D. 30, 34 (D. Mass. 2011) ("Unlike the plaintiffs in WalMart, who did not allege any specific, overarching policy of discrimination, Plaintiffs- have alleged specific and overarching systemic deficiencies within DCF that place children at risk of
harm."); Jermyn v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 276 F.R.D. 167, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Logory v. Cnty.
of Susquehanna, 277 F.R.D. 135, 143 (M.D. Pa. 2011) ("Unlike Dukes, where commonality was
destroyed where there was no 'common mode of exercising discretion that pervade[d] the entire
company,' here there is a solid policy that applied directly to all potential class members." (alteration in original)); In re U.S. Foodservice Inc. Pricing Litig., Nos. 3:06-cv-1657(CFD), 3:07-md1894(CFD), 3:08-cv-4(CFD), 3:08-cv-5(CFD), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138238, at *26 n.16 (D.
Conn. Nov. 29, 2011) ("Unlike the plaintiffs in Wal-Mart Stores, plaintiffs here are all affected by
the same practice of the defendant, namely its use of the VASPs to calculate the cost component
of the cost-plus markup price."); Churchill v. Cigna Corp., No. 10-6911, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
90716, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2011) ("Dukes is inapposite.... Cigna indisputably has a national policy of denying coverage for ABA to treat ASD."); Stinson v. City of New York, No. 10
Civ. 4228, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100634, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2012); Chen-Oster,2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 99270, at *6-7 ("What was missing in Dukes, but is present here, are 'specific employment practice[s]' (the 360-degree review, for example) that 'tie all of [Plaintiffs'] claims together."' (alteration in original)); Spurlock v. Fox, No. 3:09-cv-756, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59123,
at *12-13 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 27, 2012) ("Whereas [Dukes] involved the exercise of discretion in
each of the allegedly unlawful employment decisions, this case involves allegations of the same
conduct toward all the class members .... "); Chieftain Royalty Co. v. XTO Energy, Inc., No.
CIV-11-29-FHS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51593, at *18 (E.D. Okla. Apr. 12, 2012) ("The discretion afforded Wal-Mart supervisors with respect to employment decisions stands in stark contrast to a uniform policy employed by an oil and gas exploration company for the payment of
royalties.").
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on the basis of a common policy are FLSA class actions, which distinguish Dukes on the ground that, unlike the decentralized decision
making behind Wal-Mart's hiring and promotion practices, there were
individual wage policies that affected all employees uniformly. 48 In
other cases, they have identified some other common features that
they held would yield common answers for all class members, such as
49
a common right of way that implicates all class members' properties,
an alleged common defect, 50 or (under certain circumstances) a com-

mon misrepresentation. 51

In fact, the Dukes opinion has already spurred innovation in the

treatment of common issues. Rule 23(c)(4) authorizes courts to cer48. See Ross v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 667 F.3d 900, 909 (7th Cir. 2012) ("[Bloth classes maintain
a common claim that Charter One broadly enforced an unlawful policy denying employees
earned-overtime compensation. This unofficial policy is the common answer that potentially
drives the resolution of this litigation."); Espinoza v. 953 Assocs. LLC, 280 F.R.D. 113, 130
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) ("The facts and circumstances of Wal-Mart are very different from the instant
action. Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed to pay minimum wages and overtime compensation as a result of certain policies and practices."); Eddings v. Health Net, Inc., No. CV 101744-JST(RZx), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115989, at *2-3 (C.D. Cal. July 27, 2012) ("Because
Defendant subjected each of the purported class members to the same timekeeping and rounding policies and, moreover, the legality of those policies represents a common contention that is
central to the class members' rounding claims, Plaintiff's rounding claim satisfies Dukes and is
proper for classwide resolution."); Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 5:07-cv-4009-JAJ, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95814, at *11 (N.D. Iowa Aug. 25, 2011) ("[U]nlike Dukes, the instant case
involves a company wide compensation policy that is applied uniformly throughout defendant's
entire Storm Lake facility."); Ugas v. H&R Block Enters., LLC, No. CV 09-6510-CAS(SHx),
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86769, at *30 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2011) ("Unlike in Wal-Mart, here plaintiffs have shown that there was 'a common mode of exercising discretion that pervades the entire
company,' at least with respect to the Pomona district.").
49. Geneva Rock Prods., Inc. v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 778, 786 (2011) ("Unlike WalMart, commonality or justiciability is not really at issue. The complaint alleges a single NITU
covering a 3.23-mile railroad right-of-way, which arguably effected a taking for all individuals
with underlying or abutting property.").
50. Cambridge Lane, LLC v. J-M Mfg. Co., No. CV 10-6638-GW(VBKx), 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 43533, at *7-8 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2012) (noting that Dukes was inapplicable because of
a common question involving allegedly defective pipe). While the court discusses this in part as
a labeling issue, the plaintiffs' theory is that the pipe was "defective" because it was not fit for
the intended purpose. Specifically, they alleged that the pipe "could no longer meet the applicable tensile strength requirements."
51. In re Ferrero Litig., 278 F.R.D. 552, 558 (S.D. Cal. 2011) ("In this case, the claims made on
behalf of the proposed class are based on a common advertising campaign ....); Public Emps.'
Ret. Sys. of Miss. v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 277 F.R.D. 97, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) ("The common
questions presented by this case-essentially, whether the Offering Documents were false or
misleading in one or more respects-are clearly susceptible to common answers."); Johnson v.
Gen. Mills, Inc., 276 F.R.D. 519, 521 (C.D. Cal. 2011) ("Here there is a unitary message, which
Mr. Johnson claims is fraudulent, that Wal-Mart lacked ....); Brinker v. Chi. Title Ins. Co., No.
8:10-cv-1199-T-27AEP, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44486, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2012) ("This
action is quite the opposite. The proposed class members are parties to identical closing protection letters issued by Defendants.").
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tify "issues classes" under certain circumstances. 52 The Rule had long
lain unapplied. However, in the wake of Dukes, the Seventh Circuit,
in an opinion authored by Judge Richard Posner, used it to address
common issues raised in a Title VII disparate impact case. The opinion, McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., reversed the denial of certification under Rule 23(b)(2) of a class of
African-American brokers who claimed disparate impact discrimination in pay and promotion. 53 The brokers had specifically challenged
two policies at Merrill Lynch: "teaming," which allowed brokers to
self-select into teams, and "account distribution," in which brokers
would compete for a departing broker's accounts. 54 While Judge Posner agreed that, under Dukes, the court could not certify simultaneous
claims for an injunction and backpay under Rule 23(b)(2), he instructed the lower court to certify a Rule 23(b)(2) class only on the
55
issue of disparate impact discrimination pursuant to Rule 23(c)(4).
While no courts have yet followed McReynolds in certifying an issuesonly class, Judge Posner's opinion now provides a blueprint to anyone
56
who may wish to follow that course.
Some courts have distinguished Dukes when certifying a class seeking monetary relief under Rule 23(b)(2). In some cases, they have
held that the relief sought, while not strictly injunctive, was not precluded by the holding in Dukes.5 7 In others, they have allowed more
innovative structures, such as-certifying the class under Rule 23(b)(2),
but also certifying a subclass seeking monetary relief under Rule
58
23(b)(3).
In addition, several courts have refused to follow Justice Scalia's
dictum, which stated that a full Daubert inquiry is likely necessary at
52. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4) ("When appropriate, an action may be brought or maintained as a
class action with respect to particular issues.").
53. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 492 (7th Cir.
2012).
54. Id. at 488-89.
55. Id. at 490-91.
56. It is unlikely that plaintiffs will choose this strategy as a primary goal. Declaratory relief is
notoriously hard to value, and a plaintiffs' attorney would likely need a relatively large inventory
of potential plaintiffs to shop the declaration of law around on its own. At that point, it may be
more cost effective to simply pursue the individual lawsuits, using the weight of verdicts as a tool
to negotiate a settlement later in the process.
57. Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., No. 06-12234-DJC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37974, at
*27 (D. Mass. Mar. 21, 2012) (noting that Dukes did not preclude medical monitoring as equitable relief); Gilmer v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., No. C 08-5186, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
126845, at *21 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2011) ("Dukes does not stand for the proposition that an
employer is entitled to an individualized determination of an employee's claim for back pay in
all instances in which a claim is brought as a collective or class action." (citation omitted)).
58. See Gooch v. Life Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 672 F.3d 402, 428 (6th Cir. 2012).
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the class certification stage. Most notably, the Eighth Circuit has held
that a "tailored" Daubert inquiry might suffice instead of a full inquiry.5 9 Similarly, at least one court has distinguished another of Justice Scalia's dicta, which discouraged the use of aggregative statistics
'60
in class litigation as "Trial by Formula.
Other courts have focused on some more esoteric aspects of the
Dukes opinion. Several courts have distinguished Dukes based on the
sheer size of the class. 61 Additional courts have focused on Dukes's
discussion of specifics about the class action against Wal-Mart, such as
62
the employer's state of mind.
These various distinctions tell us several things. First, they show
that defendants became emboldened by Dukes: they took what they
viewed as a favorable holding and tried to apply it to similar, but not
identical, procedural devices, such as the FLSA collective action. Defendants also tried to stop some class actions at early stages, either by
moving to dismiss cases on standing grounds, or moving to strike class
59. In re Zurn Plumbing Prods. Liab. Litig., 644 F.3d 604, 612 (8th Cir. 2011); see also Behrend
v. Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 182, 204 n.13 (3d Cir. 2011). In February 2013, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Behrend to determine the level of scrutiny expert opinions should receive at
class certification. See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, No. 11-864, 2012 WL 113090 (U.S. June 25,
2012). The Court determined that the expert testimony question was not properly before it
because Comcast had not objected to the admission of the expert report below. Comcast Corp.
v. Behrend, No. 11-864, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 2544, *10 n.4 (U.S. Mar. 27, 2013).
60. See In re TFT-LCD Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1827, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9449, at *47
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2012) (noting that the "Trial by Formula" prohibition does not apply to antitrust damages).
61. Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 10 Civ. 6950(LBS)(JCF), 201.2 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 99270, at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2012) ("Dukes is distinguishable in another way. Time
after time the Supreme Court circled back to the issue of scale .... Not so [for] Plaintiffs in this
case. Plaintiffs do not number in the millions .. ");Cronas v. Willis Grp. Holdings, Ltd., No. 06
Civ. 15295(RMB), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122736, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2011) ("Very much
unlike Wal-Mart, where the class had 1.5 million members and 3,400 store locations were involved, the Cronas class of 317 officer-level women were all employed at a single location ....
"
(citation omitted)): Delagarza v. Tesoro Ref'g & Mktg. Co., No. C-09-5803, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 101127, at *26 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2011) ("The instant case stands in contrast to the
putative class in Dukes. Here, the purported class members all work at the same facility.").
62. Gray v. Golden Gate Nat'l Rec. Area, 279 F.R.D. 501, 518 (N.D. Cal. 2011) ("Since Rehabilitation Act claims do not require proof of the intent behind the alleged barriers, . . . the Title
VII analysis in [Dukes] is not closely on point."); Jermyn v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 276 F.R.D.
167, 171-72 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Geneva Rock Prods., Inc. v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 778, 786
(2011) ("Unlike Wal-Mart, commonality or justiciability is not really at issue. The complaint
alleges a single NITU covering a 3.23-mile railroad right-of-way, which arguably effected a taking for all individuals with underlying or abutting property."); Madanat v. First Data Corp., No.
CV 11-364(LDW)(ETB), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99390, at *15 (E.D.N.Y. May 3, 2012) ("This
case is distinguishable from Dukes because individual inquiries probing defendants' motivations
are both unnecessary and irrelevant."); Driver v. Appleillinois, LLC, No. 06 C 6149, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 27659, at *6-7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 2,2012) ("Unlike a Title VII claim, the answer to that
question does not involve probing into the motive or intent on the part of any defendant.").
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allegations. In general, these proposed expansions of the scope of the
Dukes opinion did not meet with success. 63 Second, the distinctions
show that plaintiffs have made (and courts have accepted) numerous
arguments to distinguish the Supreme Court's rulings in Dukes. The
most successful arguments, those that will likely shape future class action complaints, have focused on explicit common policies as the
"glue" that binds the class together. Finally, these reactions show that
courts still exhibit a range of attitudes toward class actions, ranging
from adopting Dukes uncritically to contradicting seemingly clear
statements in the opinion.
After reviewing the reactions to Dukes, it is clear that, while the
decision has had a definite effect on the certification strategy of various parties, it has not led to the demise of the class action, or even a
reduction in employment class actions. Instead, it has led plaintiffs to
frame their allegations in terms of a single policy or practice that applies to the entire class. In fact, this framing is not new; many successful plaintiffs framed their arguments in support of certification in this
64
way even before the Dukes opinion.
V.

PRE-DUKES DOCTRINAL DRIFT IN COMMONALITY
AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Historically, there have been a limited number of turning points in
the forty-six years of modern class action practice. There are three
primary sources of large-scale changes to class action practice: (1) the
amendments to Rule 23; (2) statutory enactments; and (3) Supreme
Court rulings. Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are
proposed by the Judicial Conference of the United States, which
meets annually to consider recommendations "to promote uniformity
of management procedures and the expeditious conduct of court business." 65 In other words, to amend Rule 23, one must convince enough
judges of the necessity of the amendment that their representatives
will reach a working consensus at one of the Judicial Conferences.
63. This is not to say that such tactics could never succeed. See Pilgrim v. Universal Health
Card, LLC, 660 F.3d 943, 948 (6th Cir. 2011) (affirming the striking of class allegations and citing
Dukes in support of the proposition that "[w]here and when featured providers offered discounts
is a prototypical factual issue that will vary from place to place and from region to region").
64. See, e.g., Gintis v. Bouchard Transp. Co., 596 F.3d 64, 67 (1st Cir. 2010) (affirming certification of an environmental class action because a defendant's uniform opposition to the admissibility of its own records created a dispositive common issue); Daffin v. Ford Motor Co., 458 F.3d
549, 553 (6th Cir. 2006) ("The question that forms the basis for Ford's argument is one of contract interpretation: whether Ford's express warranty promises to cover the alleged defect in the
throttle body assembly even if no sticking occurs during the warranty period. This is an issue
that can be decided on the merits so as to bind both Ford and the class.").
65. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2006).
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Consequently, as one might imagine, there have been a limited number of amendments to Rule 23. Table 1 summarizes these
amendments.
TABLE

1:

AMENDMENTS TO RULE

YEAR

23

AMENDMENT

1966

Introduces Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out classes; "modern" era of class actions begins.

1987

Makes technical amendments to Rule 23.

1998

Adds Rule 23(f), allowing for interlocutory appeal of certification decisions.

2003

Codifies practice as evolved.

2007

Simplifies text.

2009

General change to timing in rules: 10 days becomes 14 days.

Some of these amendments-like those in 1987 and 2007-have
had little effect on class action practice. Others, like the 1966 amendments, the 1998 introduction of Rule 23(f), and several of the changes
in 2003, have had immediate and far-reaching impacts. For example,
Rule 23(f) has led to the development of a larger body of federal class
action opinions. Similarly, the more stringent requirements for orders
certifying classes that were introduced in 2003 have led gradually to
' '6 6
caselaw that guides a court in conducting its "rigorous analysis.
The second source of major change in class action law is statutory
enactment. The two most significant statutes affecting class actions
that Congress has passed are the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act in 199567 and the Class Action Fairness Act in 2005.68 While
these are the two most influential statutes, various parties often attempt to influence class action practice: the most recent proposal for
statutory change came from Senator Al Franken, who offered a bill
69
that would specifically reverse several of the holdings in Dukes.
Changing class action law through legislation, however, tends to be a
long and unpredictable process.
Finally, changes in class action practice have come from the U.S.
Supreme Court. Once again, however, there are a limited number of
opinions that significantly affect class action practice. This makes
66. See, e.g., Wachtel v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 453 F.3d 179, 185 (3d Cir. 2006); Ross
v,RBS Citizens, N.A., 667 F.3d 900, 905 (7th Cir. 2012).
67. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 109-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1 (2006)).
68. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d) (2006)).
69. See The Equal Opportunity Employment Restoration Act of 2012, S.3317, 112th Cong.
§ (2)(b) (2012) ("The purpose of this Act is to restore employees' ability to challenge, as a
group, discriminatory employment practices, including subjective employment practices.").
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sense: before Rule 23(f) was enacted, the Court would only have
granted certiorari for disputes arising from final judgments; after Rule
must convince an appellate court to essentially
23(f), an appellant
70
"grant cert" -a

rare occurrence at best-and then possibly repeat
the process with the Supreme Court.
TABLE
YEAR

2:

SIGNIFICANT SUPREME COURT RULINGS
PRIMARY HOLDING

CASE

1974

Eisen v. Carlisle &
71
Jacquelin

Notice must be sent to all class members who can be
identified through reasonable effort, with cost borne by
Plaintiffs. Court cannot base certification decision on
opinion of merits.

1982

of the Sw.
Gen. Tel.7Co.
2
v. Falcon

Class representative must be member of class.

1988

Basic Inc. v. Levinson

Plaintiffs may invoke presumption of reliance for
securities cases involving efficient capital markets.

1997

Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
4
Windsor 7

Clarifies standards for typicality and predominance;
clarifies role of Rule 23 analysis in settlement approval.

1999

Ortiz v. Fibreboard
75
Corp.

Clarifies standard for Rule 23(b)(1) limited fund
classes.

2011

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
76
Dukes

Common questions require common answers and Rule
23(b)(2) not available for significant monetary relief.

2011

AT&T Mobility LLC v.
77
Concepcion

Holds arbitration clauses not per se unconscionable in
class actions, even if classwide arbitration not possible.

2011

Smith v. Bayer Corp.

2011

Erica P. John Fund, Inc.
79
v. Halliburton Co.

73

78

Denial of certification carries no collateral estoppel
effect.
Plaintiff does not need to prove loss causation at the
class certification stage.

However, the lack of major turning points does not mean that the
law does not change over time. It just changes incrementally through
the application of years of opinions within a given jurisdiction. 80 This
70. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f) advisory committee's note ("The court of appeals is given unfettered
discretion to permit the appeal, akin to the discretion exercised by the Supreme Court in acting
on a petition for certiorari."); see also Barry Sullivan and Amy Kobelsku Trueblood, Rule 23(19:
A Note on Law & Discretion in the Courts of Appeals, 246 F.R.D. 277, 278 (2008).
71. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
72. See Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
73. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
74. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
75. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
76. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
77. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
78. See Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368 (2011).
79. See Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011).
80. For a description of one mechanism for this incremental change, see Oona A. Hathaway,
Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2001).
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description of legal change-as incremental over time and dependent
to some extent on previous rulings-is familiar to many legal scholars.
Yet it does not fully explain how changes in the law occur. And this is
where both progressive and reform arguments often go awry: each of
them tends to assume a single, preferred direction to legal change
(sometimes called a "normative" direction), from which any deviation
may prove disastrous. But that is not how litigation actually works in
a common law system. To be sure, judicial opinions rely on precedent,
and judges cannot escape their preconceptions, political or otherwise. 8 ' Both of these forces can create inertia in a given direction: a
judge surrounded by a given set of precedent will likely absorb the
underlying logic of those cases, and will likely rule similarly, perpetuating a "direction" to the law.
So what would account for legal change, then? Another input to
the process exists: the litigants themselves. Commentators tend to
consider legal education to be effective at inculcating certain values in
lawyers, among them a respect for the rule of law. But many ignore
the truth found in conventional wisdom about lawyers, namely that
82
for a litigator a rule is often just something to be argued around.
And, throughout its history, the class action has attracted particularly
"adventuresome" lawyers. 83 As a result, despite apparently clear doctrines surrounding commonality and the availability of injunctive relief that existed in 1966, lawyers continued to make arguments to
expand the meaning of a "common issue" to attach certain kinds of
"equitable" monetary relief to the injunctions allowed under Rule
23(b)(2). Viewed in this context, the Dukes ruling was not so much a
rollback but rather a course correction, reining in doctrines that had
drifted too far from their original justifications.

81. RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 68-73 (2008); see also Chris Guthrie et al.,
Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5, 17 (2007) (noting
that judges tend to be intuitive decision makers).
82. See, e.g., AMBROSE BIERCE, THE DEVIL'S DICTIONARY 187 (1911) ("LAWYER, n. One

skilled in circumvention of the law."). For a more nuanced discussion, see WENDEL, supra note
20, at 117 ("Lawyers know that no matter how clear a rule appears to be, there will be some
exploitable ambiguity, some room for manipulation.").
83. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617-18 ("In the decades since the 1966
revision of Rule 23, class action practice has become ever more 'adventuresome' as a means of
coping with claims too numerous to secure their 'just, speedy, and inexpensive determination'
one by one.").
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COMMON QUESTIONS HAVE ALWAYS REQUIRED
COMMON ANSWERS

The Dukes formulation of commonality quotes the late Professor
Richard Nagareda.8 4 Professor Nagareda, for all his undeniable in85
sight, did not conjure this "common answers" standard from thin air.
Instead, the "common answers" standard reflected years of research
into how courts handled class actions, as well as delving into how
courts treated the issue of common questions and common answers. 86
In fact, courts have always required class actions to provide common answers. This standard arose as a practical matter, not only
through the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3), but also
through the application of a "cohesiveness" requirement under Rule
23(b)(2). 87 The notion of common answers also arose in discussions of
Rule 23(a)'s "typicality" requirement.8 8 The reason these courts required class actions to provide "common answers" is not out of a systemic conspiracy to favor business interests over consumers; rather, in
those rare instances when a class action proceeds to trial, resolving
common issues is vital to keeping the trial on track and applying the
verdict to absent class members. 89
84. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557 (2011) (quoting Richard A.
Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof,84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 101 (2009)).
85. Cf. Klonoff, supra note 14, at 50 ("Instead of looking at the traditional methods of interpreting Rule 23(a)(2), the majority relied heavily on a law review article by Professor
Nagareda."). Professor Klonoff implies that the Court relied on Professor Nagareda instead of
cases interpreting commonality. However, Professor Nagareda's article contains extensive analysis of various cases that interpret the commonality and predominance requirements. See Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof,84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 115-25
nn.62-95 (2009).
86. See, e.g., Nagareda, supra note 85, at 115-25 nn.62-95.
87. See Shook v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 543 F.3d 597, 604 (10th Cir. 2008) ("Rule 23(b)(2)
demands a certain cohesiveness among class members with respect to their injuries, the absence
of which can preclude certification."); see also Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402,
413 (5th Cir. 1998) ("[Blecause of the group nature of the harm alleged and the broad character
of the relief sought, the (b)(2) class is, by its very nature, assumed to be a homogenous and
cohesive group ....
).
88. See Sprague v. Gen. Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388, 399 (6th Cir. 1998) ("The premise of the
typicality requirement is simply stated: as goes the claim of the named plaintiff, so go the claims
of the class."); see also Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 340
(4th Cir. 1998) (same). Sprague v. General Motors Corp. also contains a discussion of commonality that presages Professor Nagareda's work and the eventual reasoning in Dukes: "It is not
every common question that will suffice, however; at a sufficiently abstract level of generalization, almost any set of claims can be said to display commonality. What we are looking for is a
common issue the resolution of which will advance the litigation." Sprague, 133 F.3d at 397.
Sprague's influence was felt primarily in rulings on typicality, however.
89. See, e.g., Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 611 F.3d 1324, 1334-35 (11th Cir. 2010)
(explaining that individualized inquiries into liability would have to be reopened for each class
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Before the 1966 amendments to Rule 23, courts grappled with the
same arguments about common questions and answers that they do
today. For example, in Bairn & Blank, Inc. v. Warren-Connelly Co.,90
a trial court for the southern district of New York refused to allow an
antitrust case to proceed as a class action, reasoning that there was no
common question because different rights were at stake, different defendants were involved in the litigation, and the plaintiff sought different relief from each defendant. 91 Similarly, in Zachman v. Erwin, a
trial court for the southern district of Texas faced a number of motions
to dismiss in a securities class action. 92 The court held that the "action
should be dismissed as a class action" because the plaintiffs could not
adequately define the class.93 However, the court's critique of the
class definition sounds remarkably like the modern critique of the
commonality requirement:
Who is this amorphous group [the plaintiffs] claim to represent?
All persons whom they claim defendants have "done wrong" in selling any of the securities involved? Though there may appear to be
a common question of law or fact involved, such a question must be
defined with clarity so that plaintiffs may be seen to "constitute a
class" if 94they are going to maintain a class action under Rule
23(a)(3).
In other words, a highly abstract common question would not be
enough to justify class treatment.
VII.

COURTS HAVE STRUGGLED OVER WHETHER TO APPLY
RULE 23(b)(2) TO MONETARY RELIEF

The Dukes Court also carefully reviewed the use of Rule 23(b)(2) in
certification. The central debate over when a class action may properly mix monetary and injunctive relief was long-standing. Indeed,
Rule 23(b)(2) certification has never been as straightforward as some
commentators seem to believe. 95 In addition to having to meet the
member because a federal court hearing damages-phase arguments regarding the tobacco class
action could only give estoppel effect to issues actually heard by a jury).
90. Bairn & Blank, Inc. v. Warren Connelly Co., 19 F.R.D. 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
91. Id. at 111.
92. Zachman v. Erwin, 186 F. Supp. 681 (S.D. Tex. 1959).
93. Id. at 688. Before the 1966 amendments took effect, there was no separate provision for
certification of a class.
94. Id. at 688-89. Before 1966, Rule 23(a)(3) allowed for "spurious" class actions-essentially
opt-in class actions for monetary damages or other individualized relief.
95. See Suzette M. Malveaux, Fighting to Keep Employment Discrimination Class Actions
Alive: How Allison v. Citgo's PredominationRequirement Threatens to Undermine Title VII En-

forcement, 26 BERKELY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 405, 413 (2005) (arguing that the advisory committee
anticipated the certification of some Rule 23(b)(2) class actions that included monetary relief);
Neil K. Gehlawat, Monetary Damages and the (b) (2) Class Action: A Closer Look at Wal-Mart v.
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four requirements of Rule 23(a), proponents of a Rule 23(b)(2) class
action have long had to demonstrate that the proposed class was suffi96
ciently cohesive to justify certification.
In fact, historically it was quite clear that (1) Rule 23(b)(2) was reserved for cases of indivisible injunctive relief and (2) because of that
indivisible nature, the class would have to be at least as cohesive as an
opt-out class under Rule 23(b)(3). The advisory committee's notes to
the 1966 amendments to Rule 23(b)(2) clearly emphasize indivisible
injunctive relief: "Illustrative are various actions in the [civil rights]
field where a party is charged with discriminating unlawfully against a
class, usually one whose members are incapable of specific enumeration. '97 It would be hard to award individualized equitable reliefsuch as the backpay the Dukes plaintiffs sought-to class members
one could not identify.
Ironically, the original decision to seek certification of injunctiverelief classes was itself a strategic decision. For example, if blacks who
were excluded from segregated facilities sued only on their own behalf, they ran the risk of the facilities granting the individual plaintiffs
access as an exception to the general policy of segregation. 98 As the
advisory committee observed, the civil rights injunctions on which
Rule 23(b)(2) was based did not concern themselves with any kind of
individualized relief. To the contrary, they specifically sought relief on
behalf of a class in which one could not identify the class members.
To take one example, Potts v. Flax99 involved a pair of parents who
challenged the system of compulsory racial segregation in the Fort
Worth, Texas school system. 10 0 The school board argued that the case
Dukes, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1535, 1552 (2012) ("[B]ackpay fits the remedial focus of (b)(2) class
actions ....").
96. See, e.g., Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 248 (3d Cir. 1975) ("By its very
nature, a (b)(2) class must be cohesive as to those claims tried in the class action.").
97. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) advisory committee's note (emphasis added).
98. The Class Action Device in Antisegregation Cases, Comment, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 577, 578
(1953) ("One reason that the class action appears to be an advantageous method of securing
relief for the group is that a favorable decree will in its terms apply to all members. A decree
rendered in an action brought by an individual on grounds that he is being discriminated against
will require the defendant to desist from such practices only where the individual is concerned.
The position of the group will improve only if compliance with the decree by the defendant
incidentally inures to the benefit of all members. But a decree rendered in a class action will
benefit directly the group as a unit." (footnote omitted)).
This debate persists in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions for monetary relief. In the 2012-2013Term,
the Supreme Court will hear argument in Genesis HealthCare Corp. v. Symczyk, a FLSA collective action in which the defendant tried to moot the case by offering the named plaintiff the
specific monetary relief he sought. Symczyk v. Genesis HealthCare Corp., 656 F.3d 189 (3d Cir.
2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 26 (2012).
99. Potts v. Flax, 313 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1963).
100. Flax v. Potts, 204 F. Supp. 458, 460 (N.D. Tex. 1962).
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should not be treated as a class action because it was possible to give
the individual plaintiffs the relief they requested without dismantling
the entire segregated school system. 10 1 The school board also pointed
out that neither of the plaintiffs had specifically stated that they
wished to bring the case as a class action.1 0 2 The trial court was unimpressed, noting that, by 1962,
the fundamental issue and the type of relief required to be granted
in such cases have become so well defined that, when the cases are
properly pleaded, they can be treated as class actions from the allegations in the complaint and the evidence as a whole satisfactory to
the court establishing the requirements usually made in actions representative in form, without any 1direct
statement by the plaintiffs
03
that they are acting for the class.
In other words, so long as the case was designated as a class action in
the pleadings, the parties did not have to specifically provide addi10 4
tional evidence that classwide treatment was warranted.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit observed that, despite the testimony of
the litigants, the relief they sought would necessarily require an injunction that would affect all residents of the school district, not just
their own children.
Properly construed the purpose of the suit was not to achieve specific assignment of specific children to any specific grade or school.
The peculiar rights of specific individuals were not in controversy.
It was directed at the system-wide policy of racial segregation. It
sought obliteration of that policy of system-wide racial discrimination. In various ways this was sought through suitable declaratory
orders and injunctions against any rule,
regulation, custom or prac10 5
tice having any such consequences.
It therefore affirmed the class treatment of the case. In other words,
because the lawsuit was really aimed at the systemic problem of segregation, the relief the individual plaintiffs sought was indistinguishable
from classwide relief.
The court also took a moment to commend the district court on its
"detailed and able opinion," which "greatly simplifie[d] [its] treatment
of the case. ' 10 6 This praise for a detailed lower court opinion carries
101. Potts, 313 F.2d at 288.
102. See Flax, 204 F. Supp. at 463.
103. Id.
104. Because this was before the enactment of the "modern" Rule 23, there was no specific
procedure for certifying a lawsuit as a class action.
105. Potts, 313 F.2d at 288-89 (footnote omitted).
106. Id. at 286 n.1. The lower court was able to write such a detailed opinion, in part, because
it was considering the defendant's motion for a new trial, and could rely on the record from the
previous trial. See Flax, 204 F. Supp. at 462. However, it also explicitly recognized that a detailed opinion would facilitate appellate review, and it clearly anticipated that the losing party
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with it the seeds of what would later become the 2003 amendment's
requirement for a clear order defining the class, claims, and defenses
to be tried, as well as the Dukes majority's order to delve into the
merits of a case when necessary. So, if Rule 23(b)(2) was clearly and
historically meant to be applied in cases seeking indivisible injunctive
relief, how did the dispute in Dukes come about?
In Jefferson v. Ingersoll International,Inc., 10. 7 Judge Easterbrook's
opinion provided an abbreviated history of how plaintiffs came to
seek money damages under Rule 23(b)(2) in Title VII class actions:
For many years Rule 23(b)(2) was the normal basis of certification in Title VII pattern-or-practice cases. When this tradition took
hold, however, Title VII allowed only equitable relief and therefore
nicely fit the language of Rule 23(b)(2). True enough, class members could receive money, because back pay is a form of equitable
relief, but this relief was treated as incidental to the injunctionand, because it was deemed equitable, neither side had a right to
jury trial, so that handling the suit as a consolidated proceeding in
equity did not threaten anyone's rights.
After the Civil Rights Act of 1991, however, prevailing plaintiffs
in a Title VII suit are entitled not only to equitable relief but also to
compensatory and punitive damages. Either side may demand a
jury trial if the plaintiff seeks damages. Because the representative
plaintiffs seek both compensatory and punitive damages, Ingersoll
contended that any class should be certified under Rule 23(b)(3)
rather than Rule 23(b)(2). If the action proceeds under Rule
23(b)(3), then each member of the class must receive notice and an
opportunity to opt out and litigate (or not) on his own behalf. If it
proceeds under Rule 23(b)(2), by contrast, then no notice will be
given, and no one will be allowed to opt out. Because of this difference, Rule 23(b)(2) gives the class representatives and their lawyers
a much freer hand than does Rule 23(b)(3). Although class members who want control of their own litigation are vitally concerned
about the choice, so too are defendants-for the final resolution of
a suit that proceeds to judgment (or settlement) under Rule
23(b)(2) may be collaterally attacked by class members who conhave been notified and allowed to proceed
tend that they10should
8
independently.
From a brief review of the caselaw, it appears plaintiffs began to
argue that, because the historical purpose of a Rule 23(b)(2) class action was to enforce civil rights, classes seeking monetary relief in civil
would appeal. Id. ("The findings were intentionally prepared to give the appellate court the
benefit of the inferences and conclusions drawn from the evidence by the judge who had all the
advantages that went with the opportunity to see the witnesses and hear the evidence firsthand.").
107. Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int'l Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 896 (7th Cir. 1999).
108. Id. (citations omitted).
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rights cases could be certified under Rule 23(b)(2). In the development of Title VII, this appears to have been a historical accident.
Soon after the 1966 amendments created Rule 23(b)(2), Title VII
plaintiffs began seeking backpay as part of the relief to which they
were entitled. 10 9 The first few courts to address this question did so in
the context of Title VII rather than Rule 23(b)(2). Later, the Fifth
Circuit explicitly held that backpay was not incompatible with certification under Rule 23(b)(2). 110
A parallel line of cases, however, held to the text of Rule 23(b)(2).
For example, in 1974, the eastern district of Pennsylvania was confronted with a civil rights class action in which the plaintiffs sought
certification under both Rule 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3). 111 The plaintiffs,
individuals who had been arrested in Philadelphia and alleged they
were illegally detained until their arraignment, argued that they primarily sought an injunction to cease Philadelphia's alleged policy of
illegal detainment, but they also asked for damages that they said
112
were "incidental" to their primary relief.
The court decided to certify only the claims for injunctive relief. It
reasoned that
the issues involved in determining whether the plaintiff class is entitled to injunctive or declaratory relief are simply not the same issues
involved in determining whether individual members of the class
may be entitled to damages. There could be many reasons for denying injunctive or declaratory relief which ought not to have the effect of 113
precluding particular class members from obtaining
damages.
The court also pointed out that, because the issues were different, it
could apply different protections. For example, the court did not have
to worry whether the class was strictly ascertainable if the only relief
was an injunction.1 14 Nor would it have to engage in the time-con109. See, e.g., Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 1969) (allowing
backpay as a remedy in a Title VII class action). Neither the district nor appellate court in the
Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. litigation addressed the requirements of Rule 23 in making their
decisions. See Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 272 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Ind. 1967); Bowe, 416 F.2d
711.
110. Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 256-58 (5th Cir. 1974).
111. See Rice v. City of Philadelphia, 66 F.R.D. 17, 19-20 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 20.
114. Id. at 19 (noting that because the injunction did not require notice or an opt-out provision, "the precise definition of the class [was] relatively unimportant"). Most courts consider
ascertainability an "implicit" requirement of Rule 23. See BRIAN ANDERSON & ANDREW
TRASK, THE CLASS ACrION PLAYBOOK § 2.1.2 (2d ed. 2012).
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suming task of establishing that each class member's rights had been
115
violated, as it would if it awarded damages.
By the 1990s, the question of when injunctive relief was appropriate
for Rule 23(b)(2) certification had become a recurring one, not just
for Title VII cases but for environmental and products liability cases
as well. Plaintiffs had learned that focusing on specific injuries-like
nicotine addiction from tainted cigarettes-required individualized inquiries into causation, which made the certification of a class difficult. 116 Thus, in an effort to facilitate certifying classes, plaintiffs

began to shy away from alleging specific injuries, focusing instead on
"future injuries. 11 7 Doing so allowed them to request injunctive relief (to stop the future injury) while simultaneously seeking compensation for the exposure to increased risk. However, by the turn of the
millennium, this too had become a risky strategy. Federal appellate
courts proved suspicious of class actions that requested monetary relief while seeking certification under Rule 23(b)(2).1 1 8 Nonetheless,

plaintiffs continued to advance the argument, convincing a number of
district courts to grant certification under Rule 23(b)(2), 119 and persuading the Second Circuit to adopt an "ad hoc" approach to review120
ing 23(b)(2) certification.

Thus, by the time Dukes was making its way through the appellate
court system, the question of whether a court could certify a class for
monetary damages under Rule 23(b)(2) had been fully vetted a number of times, and the results began to depend more on the individual

predilections of the court hearing the case than any coherent line of
cases.
The Dukes opinion is not the only modern announcement of the
principle that Rule 23(b)(2) certification should only be available for

indivisible injunctive relief. The American Law Institute, which has
115. Rice, 66 F.R.D. at 20 ("In the present case, not only would the calculation of the amount
of damages depend upon the individual facts of each claimant's case, but virtually all of the
issues would have to be litigated individually in order to determine whether a particular alleged
class member was entitled to any damages at all.").
116. See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 750 (5th Cir. 1996) (reversing certification
of a class action alleging that cigarettes caused nicotine addiction because it was "permeated
with individual issues, such as proximate causation").
117. See, e.g., Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co., 655 F.3d 255, 262-63 (3d Cir. 2011) (discussing the
jurisprudence of "medical monitoring" relief for future medical injuries).
118. See, e.g., Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 1998); In re St. Jude Med.,
Inc., 425 F.3d 1116, 1120 (8th Cir. 2005); Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180,
1196 (9th Cir. 2001).
119. See, e.g., Agan v. Katzman & Korr, P.A., 222 F.R.D. 692, 701 (S.D. Fla. 2004); Orlowski
v. Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc., 172 F.R.D. 370, 375 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
120. Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 267 F.3d 147, 164 (2d Cir. 2001).
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published a number of influential Restatements of various areas of the
common law, recently published its Principlesof the Law of Aggregate
Litigation. The treatise specifically discusses the importance of the
"divisibility" of relief in class actions seeking injunctions. 121 Further,
it specifically warns against improperly characterizing relief as "indivisible" in order to enable certification of an otherwise problematic
22
class.'
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Throughout this Article, I have argued that both the progressive
and reform schools of class action commentary have allowed their
"normative" goals to blind them to important facts about the development of class action doctrine and the importance of day-to-day litigation strategy to its development. What I propose is a more strategic
model of interpreting class action doctrine. This model recognizes
that class actions can be a useful tool for mass compensation in some
cases and can also, under the right circumstances, deter corporate or
governmental misbehavior. However, class actions are also prone to
abuse. Therefore, during their existence, especially since the 1966
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, courts have
tried to balance the benefits of class actions against the potential for
their abuse.
Which is the more prevalent problem? Should we be more worried
about the masses who go uncompensated or the plaintiffs' attorneys
who enrich themselves by settling meritless but large-scale cases? The
answer is "it depends." And what it depends on is the balance of doctrine and tactics at any given time.
One of the lessons from the strategic model is that arguments over
certification do not go away. Instead, they come back in new, modified forms. There are, however, a limited number of debates over the
aggregation of claims in class actions. Moreover, changing circumstances can lend old arguments new life. As a result, any evolution of
class action law is a product of two forces: (1) trial and error on the
part of the courts as they adapt to the changing circumstances of both
fact and law and (2) the changing arguments of plaintiffs and defend121. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.04 cmt. a ("Litigation seeking

prohibitory injunctive or declaratory relief against a generally applicable policy or practice is
already aggregate litigation in practice, because the relief that would be given to an individual
claimant is the same as the relief that would be given to an aggregation of such claimants.").
122. Id. at cmt. b ("The court also should remain alert to the possibility that a given remedy
might be mischaracterized as indivisible in an attempt to facilitate aggregation, even though the
remedy, in practical operation, will function as a divisible one.").
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ants as they, in turn, adapt to court holdings that become part of the
legal terrain.
Finally, as we are well aware from our own exposure to them, lawyers attempt to argue around even clear rules when they can. As a
result, no optimal equilibrium for class action litigation exists. Instead, there are only temporary equlibria, until the next lawyer comes
along to advance either a new argument or a new application of the
old rules that will favor her side. Seen in this light, the Dukes opinion
is not so much a rollback as a correction in a constantly shifting game,
in which both plaintiff and defense lawyers are arguing for new applications of class action rules.

